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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COM- «
PANY, a corporation, and UTAH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and
i
ROBERT GORLINSKI,
I
Defendants and Appellants.
CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM,
,
Cross-Plaintiff and Appellant)
vs.
EXCELSIOR IRON MINING COMPANY, a corporation, and UTAH
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
corporation,
Cross-Defendants and Appellees.j

Case No.
7825

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES
This case involves the title to certain land in Iron
Springs Mining District, Iron County, Utah. Prior to the
commencement of this case title to the land here involved
was three times made the subject of litigation in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah.
In all three cases the judgment of the federal court confirmed title to the land in respondents' predecessors in
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interest. In the last of those cases the exact contentions
made here by appellants were expressly rejected by the
court. The decisions of the federal court will be discussed in detail later in this brief.
A.
HISTORY OF PROPERTY INVOLVED
Appellants have devoted the first 26 pages of their
brief to what is designated as a statement of facts. Most
of the essential facts are not in dispute. Such facts as
appellants rely upon to support their argument, and as to
which there is dispute, will be specifically referred to
hereinafter. To give continuity and proper sequence to
our argument we will be under the necessity of restating
those facts which dominate the case and which, we urge,
compel an affirmance of the trial court's judgment and
decree.
A-l
ARMSTRONG PATENT CONVEYED ENTIRE SURFACE
OF CONFLICT AREA.
Prior to October 4,1871, the Southeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 32, T. 35 S, E 12 W.,
SLBM, was open and unoccupied public domain subject
to location and appropriation pursuant to applicable mining laws. It is with that quarter section that we are here
dealing. Then, as now, if a citizen discovered mineral
upon the open and unoccupied public domain he could
locate a claim or claims thereon and thereby appropriate
the same to his own use and ownership. If the mineral
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so discovered was within rock in place it was subject to
location only as a lode or vein. If the mineral was contained within the surface material and not a part of rock
in place it was subject to location only as a placer claim.
If locations were validly made and all the preliminary
steps taken prerequisite to United States Patent, a patent
would issue upon proper application, and a charge would
be made for placer ground at the rate of $2.50 an acre,
and for a vein or lode at the rate of $5.00 an acre.
On October 4, 1871, Blair, Smith and Adams made a
valid placer location upon all of the quarter section above
described. (Ex. B to Stipulation, Field Notes) The effect
of that location was to segregate the quarter section from
the public domain and subject it to all of the rights of the
locators. Soon after perfecting the location the locators sold the claim to Joseph H. Armstrong, and the
claim at all times since then has been known and referred
to as the Armstrong Placer.
In 1872 preliminary steps, including an agreement
for survey, were taken toward carrying the location of
the Armstrong Placer to patent. (Ex. B to Stipulation,
Field Notes) The location of the Armstrong Placer would
have clearly entitled the locators and their successors in
interest to a United States patent covering the entire
quarter section including all of the surface and all of the
ores and minerals beneath the surface except for the fact
that there existed within the placer claim a "known lode
or vein" of iron ore. The lode or vein was known to exist
because it outcropped so conspicuously above the surrounding surface that it could be seen for many miles.
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The existence of the known lode referred to is of critical
and dominating importance in this case.
Armstrong desired to and was entitled to receive a
United States patent for all of the surface within his
location as placer ground, and for all of the known lode
or vein as such. By reason of the existence of the known
lode or vein within his placer claim Armstrong's application for patent was required to conform to Revised Statute 2333, Title 30, Section 37, United States Code Annotated, if he expected to acquire title to the known lode or
vein, or any part thereof. Because the statute just cited
controlled the situation in which Armstrong found himself, and because it dominates and controls the rights of
the parties to this case, we here set it forth :
"Where the same person, association, or corporation is in possession of a placer claim, and
also a vein or lode included within the boundaries
thereof, application shall be made for a patent for
the placer claim, with the statement that it includes such vein or lode, and in such case a patent
shall issue for the placer claim, subject to the provisions of sections 21-24, 26-30, 33-48, 50-52, 71-76
of this title, including such vein or lode, upon the
payment of $5 per acre for such vein or lode claim,
and twenty-five feet of surface on each side thereof. The remainder of the placer claim, or any
placer claim not embracing any vein or lode claim,
shall be paid for at the rate of $2.50 per acre, together with all costs of proceedings; and where a
vein or lode, such as is described in section 23 of
this title, is known to exist within the boundaries
of a placer claim, and application for a patent for
such placer claim which does not include an appliDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cation for the vein or lode claim shall be construed
as a conclusive declaration that the claimant of the
placer claim has no right of possession of the vein
or lode claim; but where the existence of a vein or
lode in a placer claim is not known, a patent for the
placer claim shall convey all valuable mineral and
other deposits within the boundaries thereof."
Following the foregoing section as it appears in
U.S.C.A. there is a note by the annotator which reads:
"This section (Title 30, Sec. 37, U.S.C.A.)
is not in conflict with Section 23 of this title but
is intended to refer to lode claims found only within the limits of a placer location, while Section 23
of this title refers to lode locations generally, exclusive of those within the limits of a placer claim.
Mt. Eosa Min. etc. Co. v. Palmer, 56 Pac. 176."
(U.S.C.A. Title 30, Sec. 37, p 325)
The controlling importance of the distinction noted
above will become clear as the full history of the property
is revealed.
Application for patent was filed by Armstrong in
1874. (Ex. B to Stipulation, Field Notes) At that time he
knew of the existence of the lode or vein, and he knew
that if his application for patent to the Armstrong Placer
did not include an application for the vein or lode his
application would be construed as a conclusive declaration
that he had no right or interest in the vein or lode. (Title
30, Sec. 37 U.S.C.A.) Accordingly, in his application for
patent Armstrong described the area claimed as placer
ground and attempted to describe an area which embraced
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all of the vein or lode throughout its length to the south
boundary of his placer claim which was the south line of
the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section
32. (See field notes attached to stipulation and map made
part of patent, finding No. 1.) His application described
the vein or lode by metes and bounds, and after survey
by the Suveyor General the application for patent was
granted. In the meantime Walker and Blair succeeded
to the rights of Armstrong and they were named as
patentees in the United States patent which issued on the
16th day of December 1879. (PP. 1-3 Ex. AA, Abstract)
In the application for patent the placer ground was
referred to as the Armstrong Placer and the lode or vein
as the Armstrong Iron Mine. The Armstrong Iron Mine
was given lot no. 41 by the surveyor, and the patent describes the iron mine granted to the patentee as the "Armstrong Iron Mine, Lot 41." The issuance of the patent
to Walker and Blair raised a conclusive presumption that
the location was valid and that all things required by law
prior to patent had been done. (Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed.,
Vol. 3, Sec. 777 p. 1891)
Upon receipt of the United States patent covering
the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong Iron Mine,
Lot 41, Walker and Blair became the owners of all the
land described in, and granted by thejpatent, and it was
stipulated in this case that SppSKSS^ Excelsior Iron
Mining Company, has succeeded to all of the rights and
interests conveyed by the United States patent to Walker
and Blair. (Tr. 22 et seq.)
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The trial court included a copy of the patent in its
finding No. 1. Keference to that patent will disclose that
there is attached to and made a part thereof a map showing the extent and location of the Armstrong Iron Mine,
Lot 41, as it lay within the confines of the Armstrong
Placer. The map will also disclose that the land conveyed
as placer ground includes all of the quarter section except
that embraced within the Armstrong lode, Lot 41. The
map shows Lot 41 as extending from its north end line to
the south line of the Armstrong Placer, which in turn is
the south line of the quarter section.
In his finding No. 17 the trial court found that it was
the intention of the parties to the Armstrong patent that
the Armstrong Iron Mine, Lot 41, should include all the
area shown as Lot 41 upon the map attached to the
patent, "but because of an error in the survey which attempted to establish the south boundary of the southwest
quarter of the northwest quarter of section 32, the ground
in controversy was not covered by the metes and bounds
description of the Armstrong Mine, Lot 41, and therefore,
by inadvertence, the conflict area was not described in
the United States patent as a part of the Armstrong Mine,
Lot 41."
From the granting of the Armstrong patent in December 1879, until the year 1902, no one ever challenged
the correctness of the descriptions shown upon the map
in the Armstrong Patent, and the patentees assumed that
their lode location extended from its north boundary to
the quarter section line.
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We remind the court in this connection that by force
of Eevised Statute 2333 quoted above that inasmuch as
the existence of the entire Armstrong Lode was known
at the time of the application for patent, if any part of
it was not described in the application for patent then
the part not described was segregated from the land
claimed by the applicant for patent and continued to be
subject to location, even though in conflict with the surface rights of the placer claim.
A-2

JONES LOCATION COVERED ENTIRE LODE WITHIN
CONFLICT AREA, AND PATENT COVERED ENTIRE LODE
AND 50 FEET UPON SURFACE.
In 1902 Thomas J. Jones located the Cora No. 1,
amended, lode claim. (Ex. AA p. 13) In connection with
his location he caused a survey to be made and the surveyor concluded that the metes and bounds description
of the lode claim contained in Armstrong's application for
patent, and in the patent itself was such that the Armstrong Iron Mine, Lot 41, failed to extend to the south
line of the Armstrong Placer by a distance of approximately 135 feet. If that were true then the south 135 feet
of the Armstrong Lode, as distinguished from the surface,
was not covered by the application or the patent. The
effect of such omission was that the 135 feet involved was
covered only by the placer patent, and the lode beneath
continued to be subject to lode location. Jones, believing
that the south 135 feet of the Armstrong Lode had not
been covered by the patent embraced that area within his
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location of the Cora. The boundaries marked off and described in his location of the Cora, covered an area approximately 135 feet north and south along the Armstrong vein or lode and 600 feet east and west. That area
lay within the limits of the Armstrong Placer and covered
the south 135 feet of the Armstrong Mine. (See Ex. AA
pp. 13, 14 and Ex. B to Stipulation Tr. 42 et seq.)
As stated above, up until the Jones location, Armstrong and his successors in interest had assumed that
their patent covered all of the Armstrong vein or lode to
and including the south boundary of the placer claim.
The location of the Cora No. 1 encroached to the extent
of 135 feet by 600 feet upon the area embraced within the
Armstrong Placer. This encroachment created a conflict
and the area so encroached upon became a conflict area
as that term is used by miners, and was referred to
thoughout the trial of this case as the "conflict area."
By 1902 the Excelsior Iron Mining Company of Wyoming became successor in interest to Walker and Blair,
and as such became the owners of the Armstrong Placer
and the Armstrong Iron Mine.
It is a rule of mining law from which we have never
seen any dissent that the valid location of a mining claim
serves to segregate the area described in the location
from the public domain. It gives to the locator the equivalent of a fee simple title against all the world except
the United States Government, and gives to the locator
the right to acquire the title remaining in the government
if he performs the acts prerequisite to the issuance of a
patent. This general rule is subject to the requirement
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that the location must be made upon a lode or vein which
is open to location. (Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed., Vol. 2,
Sec. 322, p. 733)
A-3
FEDERAL COURT TWICE QUIETED TITLE TO ENTIRE
CONFLICT AREA IN JONES BASED UPON CORA LOCATION.

In 1904, Excelsior brought suit in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Utah for the purpose of quieting title as against Jones to the entire conflict area. At that time Jones' right rested entirely upon
his location of the Cora claim. He had not then applied
for nor received any patent. After a hearing the federal
court, Judge John A. Marshall sitting, decreed that Jones'
location upon the entire conflict area, being approximately 135 feet north and south by 600 feet east and west, was
a valid location, and quieted title in Jones and against
Excelsior. A subsequent suit was filed in the federal
court in 1906 wherein Excelsior again sought to quiet title
in the conflict area against all of the claims asserted by
Jones. A trial of that case was begun and during the
trial a stipulation was entered upon as the result of which
Judge Marshall again quieted title to the entire conflict
area in Jones. In the course of his opinion Judge Marshall in harmony with all the law upon the subject, ruled
that by his location upon the conflict area Jones had acquired the right to the entire lode within the area, but
would be entitled to receive patent for only 50 feet upon
the surface. The stipulation made in connection with the
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decree contained an agreement by the parties to the litigation that Jones might proceed to patent the conflict
area without any protest or "adverse" by Excelsior, and
that upon the procuring of patent he would deed the conflict area to Excelsior for a stipulated sum which Excelsior agreed to pay. (Ex. S) Accordingly, Jones made
his application for patent to the Cora No. 1. The application included the entire conflict area—135 feet by 600
feet. The survey made in connection with the application
for patent disclosed the existence of the conflict. The
Land Office therefore rejected the application for patent
upon the ground that the lode location being within the
confines of a prior placer patent, the lode locator was
entitled to the lode and only 50 feet of the surface along
the vein. Jones then amended his application to include
only 50 feet upon the surface of that portion of his claim
which lay within the conflict area. The 50 feet upon the
surface described in his amended application included his
discovery. Such inclusion was altogether necessary because all subsequent rights of any lode locator depend
upon an initial discovery of ore in place.
In response to the amended application the United
States issued its patent to Jones covering the Cora No.
1, amended, but limited the surface granted within the
conflict area to 50 feet in width. (Tr. 26, 27, 28) This
limitation, we urge, was solely a limitation upon the
surface and did not limit the lode or vein which was
granted to Jones. Such limitation of the surface rights
was required by command of Section 2333 Revised Statutes which is quoted on page 4 above.
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A-4
FEDERAL COURT ADJUDGED JONES P A T E N T
GRANTED ENTIRE LODE IN CONFLICT AREA.
After receiving his patent Jones sold all interest acquired thereby and all interest in the contract entered
into between him and Excelsior during the trial of the
case before Judge Marshall, to Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company. Colorado Fuel and Iron Company then tendered deed to that portion of the Cora lying within the
conflict area and demanded payment of the purchase
price by, Excelsior Iron Mining Company.
Excelsior rejected the tendered deed and refused to
make payment of the stipulated purchase price upon the
ground that the deed did not convey all that was bargained for. Specifically, Excelsior claimed that because
the patent to Jones described only 50 feet in width upon
the surface, the patent did not convey all of the iron
lode lying within the conflict area.
Suit was brought in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, by Colorado Fuel and Iron Company against Excelsior to enforce acceptance of the proffered deed and the payment of the purchase price therefor.
In preparation for the defense of the case Excelsior
employed Eobert Grorlinski, one of the appellants herein
and the principal witness in this case, to investigate the
lands involved including the ore bodies and their location,
and the surveys made in connection therewith. As an employee of Excelsior, Gorlinski made an investigation of
the properties and reported his findings and opinions to
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Excelsior. (Ex. Y, Z) Excelsior filed its answer in the
federal court action alleging it was not required to accept
and pay for the deed tendered because the United States
patent coveyed only 50 feet in width across the conflict
area; that the 50 feet conveyed was not upon the apex
of the vein, and that the portion of the conflict area lying
outside of the 50 foot strip would continue to be public
domain open to lode location. (Ex. W)
The case came on for trial in 1918 before Judge Tillman D. Johnson, and to support its defense Excelsior produced Eobert Gorlinski as its chief witness. The issue
presented to and tried by the federal court was whether
the patent to Jones conveyed all of the lode lying within
the conflict area. If it did, then Excelsior must accept
the proffered deed and pay the price stipulated therefor. If it did not, then Excelsior was not required to accept the deed nor pay the purchase price. After a trial of
the issues the federal court ruled and decided that while
the patent described only 50 feet in width upon the surface, it, nevertheless, conveyed all of the iron lode within
the conflict area; that Jones became the owner of the entire lode with the right to sell the same, and in effect that
after patent no part of the conflict area was subject to
lode location but was the property of Jones and his successors in interest. Excelsior was therefore ordered to
and did accept the proffered deed and pay the purchase
price therefor. (Ex. X)
The contentions made by Gorlinski in the federal
court case just described, and those made by him in the
court below, are, by Gorlinski's admission, identical. (Tr.
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273) The issues before Judge Johnson and those before
Judge Hoyt below are identical. (Ex. X and W) They
involved the same land and the same patent, and the same
testimony and contentions by Gorlinski. The United
States Government by its executive department made a
grant of land by patent to Jones, and by its judicial department it declared and adjudged what was conveyed
by the patent. Excelsior accepted and recorded the deed
from Colorado Fuel and Iron, and Excelsior took a deed
from Jones and his wife, conveying the entire conflict
area. Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a corporation of
Wyoming, and its successors, including respondent, Excelsior Iron Mining Company, a corporation of Utah,
have at all times since paid the taxes levied and assessed
upon the conflict area. (Tr. 167) By stipulation of the
parties, and by the findings of the court below, respondent became and is the owner of all the property conveyed
by United States Patent to Walker and Blair, and to
Thomas J. Jones. (Tr. 26, 28, 29, 30)
A copy of Judge Johnson's decree is set forth at this
point first as a statement of authority in support of our
contention, and second to show the identity of the issues
decided by him and those now before this court.
"The decision of this case turns upon the construction and application of paragraph 3 of the
contract in evidence which reads as follows:
" 'First party will at once proceed to procure
patent to the Cora No. 1 Lode and will after patent proceedings in land office have been concluded
and within six months from the date hereof, cause
to be conveyed to the second party that portion of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the said Cora No. 1 Lode lying within the said
Armstrong Placer.'
"Whether consideration is given to the contract alone in which the paragraph above quoted
is found, or whether in connection with the contract consideration is given to the circumstances
and conditions surrounding the parties and existing at the time of the making of the contract and
the matters which occurred subsequent thereto,
as appears in the record of this case, I am of the
opinion that the conclusion in respect to the meaning of the contract, as well as in respect to its
force and effect, must be the same.
"My conclusions are:
"(1) That by the contract the plaintiff undertook to procure a good title to the whole of the
iron lode lying within the conflict area, and to convey this title to the defendant.
"(2) That under the statute the rule of the
land office limiting the patented area on the surface to 50 feet in width along the course of the
vein, does not prevent the patent issued by the
Government from conveying the entire lode.
"Under the statute if the locator of a placer
claim in his application for patent makes mention
of and claims a known lode, he secures title thereto under his patent and is required to pay for his
lode claim at the rate of $5.00 per acre. The area
of his lode claim to be paid for at this rate being,
as provided by the statute, 'for such vein or lode
claim and 25 feet of surface on each side thereof.'
"Where the placer claimant secures title to a
lode lying within the limits of his placer claim, I
do not think, under this statute, there can be any
doubt that he secures title to the entire lode so
patented to him, whether it be less or more than
50 feet in width.
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"It is an inference in this case that the locator
of the Armstrong Placer secured title to this iron
lode within the boundaries of his claim, except the
135 feet thereof in litigation in this action, and the
vein which he secured was at least as wide as that
portion of the vein which for some reason he omitted to mention and claim in his application. No
one, I believe, will seriously claim that he did not
secure good title to the entire lode mentioned and
claimed by him notwithstanding the fact that he
only paid for a width of 50 feet.
"I am convinced that it was not the intention
of Congress by the legislation governing the conveyance of title to lodes and veins found within
placer claims, to provide for the conveyance of less
than the entire load whether the same was claimed
by the locator of the placer claim or by a third
party. Under the statute no different rule should
be applied in the case of a locator of a known unclaimed lode within the limits of a placer claim
than is applied when such known lode is claimed
by the placer locator in his application for patent,
and the rule of the land office limiting the surface
area of the locator to a width of 50 feet along the
lode and the conveyance to him of such limited
surface area by patent should not, in view of the
statute, be held to be a conveyance of less than the
entire lode, whatever its width might be.
"In this case whatever difficulty might arise
by the limitation contained in the patent to a width
of 50 feet of surface area is overcome by the quitclaim deed tendered the defendant of the additional surface area described in said deed.
"At the argument some question was made
with respect to the segment of the vein covered
by the application and patent, the claim being that
it was not upon the apex of the vein, that is, it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was claimed that the apex is along and immediately below the upper line of the out-crop of the lode
or vein, and that the segment covered by the patent
is along or upon the edge of the vein. From the
meager testimony in the case touching that matter
I am of the opinion that the outcrop of this iron
ledge is its apex and not an exposure of its edge
along its dip. But whether the outcrop is one or
the other is of no importance because in either
case it is one compact mineralized mass lying between definite walls, and it is not possible that one
segment of the vein could be the apex and another
segment parallel thereto could be upon the edge
of the vein on its dip. The vein is either all apex
or all the edge of the vein on its dip.
"I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has
substantially complied with its contract and is entitled to recover in this action.
"Judgment will be entered accordingly."
(Filed August 29, 1918)
The decree above quoted became final, and pursuant
to the mandate thereof, and in reliance thereon, Excelsior
paid the purchase price demanded for the entire lode
within the conflict area. In addition to receiving deed
from Colorado Fuel and Iron covering the conflict area,
Jones and his wife quit-claimed to Excelsior all of their
right, title and interest in and to the conflict area. (Ex.
AA p. 23)
No further challenge was directed against Excelsior's
title or its right to exclusive possession and ownership of
the conflict area until April 30, 1949. During that long
interval respondents and their predecessors in interest
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continued in the peaceful, unchallenged possession of the
conflict area, and paid the taxes thereon.
About 1942 the United States Government became
interested in the production possibilities of the land here
involved. The Bureau of Mines made geological examinations and experiments upon the property, including
trenching and diamond drilling. (Tr. 189, 110, 111) In
1946 Utah Construction Company succeeded to a lease
covering the lands here involved. (Ex. P) It entered into
possession of said property and continued the mining
and removal of iron ore therefrom. By April 30, 1949, it
had mined extensively in the conflict area and had so
far removed ores therefrom that what at one time was
an outcropping body of ore had become a mining pit
within which mining operations were being actively carried on. (Tr. 118, Exs. C, D, E, F, G, N; Tr. 200)
A-5

APPELLANTS PRETENDED LOCATIONS NOT UPON
GROUND OPEN TO LOCATION.
On April 30, 1949, Eobert Gorlinski, still remembering the information he had acquired more than thirty
years before as an employee and trusted agent of Excelsior, and still clinging to the views rejected by the
judgment of the federal court, went to a place near the
property involved for the purpose of making lode locations thereon. He must have known that Utah Construction Company was in possession of the property and actually mining the same. He must have known that it had
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
many men and much heavy equipment upon the property.
(Tr. 117-127)
He waited until the day's work had ended and the
miners had left for the day. He and Justheim then went
into the pit which had just been vacated by miners of
respondent and pretended to "discover" an iron ore deposit, and pretended to make some lode locations therein.
(Finding No. 13; Tr. 204, 205, 206, 236)
The four claims which Gorlinski and Justheim pretended to locate were all within the conflict area. Each is
approximately 135 feet long north and south, and 50 feet
wide upon the vein. (Tr. 31)
A-6
CASE COVERED BY RULE IN MT. ROSA CASE.
We have given the foregoing statement in detail for
the purpose of making it clear that this case is entirely
controlled by that very limited body of mining law which
relates to the location of a lode within a prior placer
claim. Any statute or decision which does not deal with
a lode location within a prior placer claim is unrelated to
the issues here under review.
By his lode location made on the 13th day of January,
1902, and amended on the 22 day of April, 1902, Jones
segregated from the public domain the entire lode or vein
embraced within the boundaries marked off by his location. He could not segregate from the public domain the
surface of the conflict area because the surface rights had
theretofore been segregated from the public domain and
appropriated by the Armstrong location. But Jones had
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segregated the lode and by that segregation he acquired
the right to 50 feet, and only 50 feet, upon the surface
of the entire lode to enable him to mine the ore. The effect
of Judge Marshall's decision, and that of Judge Johnson,
both referred to above, is that Jones' location entitled him
to the entire lode, and that the patent gave him the entire
lode and 50 feet upon the surface. The decisions of Judgv*
Marshall and Judge Johnson should have set at rest the
question which has here arisen, and we submit that this
court should now give effect to those judgments.
As suggested above, the volume of precedent covering the point to be decided here is limited. The controlling
case upon the subject is Mt. Rosa Mining Company v.
Painter, 56 Pac. 176. That case was decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado on February 8,1899. Eeference
to the Mt. Rosa case as controlling may seem presumptous
so we take the liberty of discussing the decision at some
length. Mt. Eosa was the owner of a placer claim which
had been conveyed to it by United States patent. Palmer
was the owner of two lode locations laid upon veins or
lodes within the placer claim after the location and
patenting of the placer. Palmer brought suit against
Mt. Rosa to quiet title to his lode claims. He alleged that
he was the owner of the lode claims to the full extent embraced within his locations. Mt. Rosa denied that Palmer
held any title or ownership within the confines of its
placer location. The trial court found that the lodes or
veins covered by Palmer's locations were "known lodes
or veins" at the time application for placer patent was
made; that such known lodes or veins were not described
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in or claimed by the application for placer patent and
were therefore subject to location by Palmer. The question, then, for decision was how much surface should
Palmer have within the placer claims. The court decided
that Palmer was entitled to the entire vein or lode covered
by his location but to only 50 feet of surface width along
the vein or lode. That decision was, when made, and still
is the only decision of a court of last resort dealing with
and deciding the precise point here involved as far as we
can discover.
Following the publication of the Mt. Eosa opinion
the law as there announced was formally adopted by the
Secretary of the Interior as the correct rule upon the
subject, and as binding and controlling upon the Land
Office.
While Mt. Eosa continues to be the only decision by
a court of last resort upon the precise point here involved,
it was interpreted, confirmed and approved in a later case
in which the Supreme Court of Colorado said in part:
"In the Mt. Eosa case, however, wherein was
defined the rights of a placer claimant, we said
that a placer location gives a qualified possession
of the ground located; that is to say, it confers upon the owner the exclusive right of possession of
the surface area for all purposes incident to the
use and operation of the same as a placer mining
claim, and all unknown lodes or veins, but does not
give the right of possession to known veins within its limits." Clipper Mining Co. v. Eli M. & L.
Co., 68 Pac. 286.
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It will be noted from the foregoing quotation that the
Colorado Supreme Court recognizes that the placer patent confers upon the owner the right of possession of the
surface for placer mining. That right can be invaded
by the locator of the lode within the placer to the extent
of only 50 feet.
The rule established by the Mt. Rosa case was clearly
recognized by the Supreme Court of Montana in Noyes
v. Clifford, 94 Pac. 842, 844. Speaking of a vein or lode
known to exist within a prior placer, the Montana court
said:
"If the lode or vein was excepted from the
terms of the patent, (placer) it, together with 25
feet on either side of, was open to exploitation
and location by any citizen of the United States."
Appellants have brought to light in their exhaustive
brief no case except the Mt. Rosa case which decided
the question here presented for review. Judge Lindley
refers to the Mt. Rosa case as the only one which "announces a definite solution of the question."
In Vol. 2, Section 415, beginning at page 969, Lindley
on Mines, Third Edition, there is a discussion of "width
of lode locations within placers" which treats extensively
of the Mt. Rosa case. On page 979 and page 980 of his discussion of the Mt. Rosa case the author says:
"The views thus entertained by the supreme
court of Colorado have recently received the approval of the secretary of the interior in a communication addressed by him to the attorneyDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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general. This communication requested that proceedings be instituted in behalf of the United
States to cancel a patent issued for a lode claim
within a prior located placer, upon the ground,
among others, that a surface covering a width of
three hundred feet had been patented, whereas
the surface width should have been limited to
twenty-five feet on each side of the center of the
vein. The secretary calls the attorney-general's
attention to the views of the department as previously expressed in the cases heretofore commented on, and then gives his unqualified sanction
to the doctrine announced by the supreme court
of Colorado, in the following language:
" 'This decision, coming from the court of last
resort of one of the principal mining states, is entitled to grave weight, and upon careful consideration of the reasons assigned for the conclusions
reached, the department is of the opinion that the
interpretation given the statute in said decision
is correct.'
"This opinion was referred to and followed
by the secretary of the interior in the case of
Daphne Lode Claim.
"With this consensus of opinion of the courts
and the land department the rule may be considered as practically settled."
The adoption of the Mt. Eosa rule by the secretary
of the interior is expressed by the decision of the Land
office in Daphne Lode Claims, 32 L. D. 513.
The Mt. Eosa rule was followed by Judge John A.
Marshall and by Judge Tillman D. Johnson in separate
cases decided by the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, involving the very land here in dispute.
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Both judges followed the Mt. Eosa rule and both rejected
the contentions made here by appellants.
Interestingly enough, appellants agree with us that
the Mt. Eosa case applies here. At page 110 of their
brief they say: "The facts of the instant case bring it
within the rule of the Mt. Eosa case above cited, and not
of the Clipper case, supra."
That the Armstrong placer locations was valid location is left beyond dispute by the issuance of the United
States patent. The Armstrong placer location segregated
from the public domain the entire surface of the conflict
area. Jones' location covered the south 135 feet of the
Armstrong lode or vein in its entire width.
Under the law above referred to Jones acquired
title to and ownership of the entire vein and 50 feet in
width upon the surface without regard to the exact location of the apex measured by elevations along the outcrop. Issuance of the Jones patent raised the conclusive
presumption: (1) that Jones' location was upon a lode
or vein known to exist when application for the Armstrong placer patent was filed; (2) that the vein or lode
had an apex; and (3) that the apex lay within the Jones
location. Those facts were found to be adequate in the
federal cases involving this same land to sustain judgments confirming title in respondents and rejecting the
claims here made by appellants. In addition, however,
the patent to Jones expressly granted to him the entire
ore body lying within the conflict area.
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A-7
JONES' PATENT SPECIFICALLY GRANTED ENTIRE
LODE.

Because of the legal requirement that the grant of
the surface had to be limited to 50 feet in width along the
vein or lode to preserve as far as possible the placer
owner's prior right to the surface the language of the
grant may seem somewhat obscure, but upon analysis of
the description it becomes clear that while the grant of
the surface was limited, the grant of the ore body was
complete.
It will be remembered that the Cora No. 1 amended
was so located and described that the north end of it,
being approximately 135 feet by 600 feet, lay in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 32,
and was to that extent in conflict with the Armstrong
Placer. The great bulk of the Cora lay in the Southwest
Quarter of Section 32.
The granting clause of the patent first describes the
Cora No. 1 amended just as located and surveyed, including all of that portion lying in the Southwest Quarter
of the Northwest Quarter of Section 32, and being in conflict with the Armstrong Placer. (Tr. 27) If the description had stopped there the grant would have given the entire surface of the conflict area to the Cora without limitation and in disregard of the placer patentee's prior
surface rights. So, after describing the land granted as
if it had embraced the conflict area without limitation,
the patent then excepts from the grant the entire conflict
area. (Tr. 27) If the description had stopped there Jones,
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patentee of the Cora, would have been denied all rights
in or to the ore body lying within the conflict area. But
because the south 135 feet of the Armstrong lode or
vein was inadvertently omitted from the Armstrong application for patent, Jones had appropriated the ore body
lying within the conflict area by reason of his lode location. So, having first included the entire conflict area
within land granted by the patent, and having then excluded the entire conflict area from the land so granted,
it was necessary to make exceptions from the exception
in order to grant to Jones that property to which he
was entitled and no more. The two exceptions saved to
Jones from the general exception were: (1) Tract A (50
feet in width upon the surface), and (2) "all veins, lodes
and ledges throughout their entire depth, the tops or
apexes of which lay inside of such excluded ground (the
conflict area)." The language used in the patent is equivalent to the government saying: "We are taking the surface of the conflict area out of your claim, but we are
giving you the ore body and 50 feet upon the surface so
that you may mine and remove the ore."
This point can be emphasized if we skeltonize the
clause of the Jones patent under discussion. After describing the entire Cora No. 1 as if no conflict existed, and
as if Jones were entitled to all the area embraced within
his location without regard to the Armstrong placer, the
patent provides:
«# # # expressly excepting and excluding from
these presents all that portion of the ground, hereinbefore described, embraced in said mining claim,
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or lot No. 48 and said southwest quarter of the
northwest quarter of Section thirty-two except
Tract A described as follows: Beginning at a
point on line 8-1 of said Cora No. 1 lode claim west
281.1 feet from corner No. 8; thence west 50 feet,
thence south 11°30' west 126.2 feet, thence north
80° 10' east 50.4 feet, thence north 11°30' east 124.6
feet to the place of beginning; and also all that
portion of said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and of all
veins, lodes and ledges, throughout their entire
depth, the tops or apexes of which lie inside of
such excluded ground."
If the language just quoted is so far skeletonized as
to eliminate nonessential language it will read as follows:
"Expressly excepting and excluding from
these presents all that portion of the ground hereinbefore described, embraced * * * in the southwest
quarter of the northwest quarter of Section 32
(all of the conflict area) except tract A (the 50,
feet upon the surface); and also that portion of
said Cora No. 1 vein or lode, and all veins, lodes
or ledges throughout the entire depth, the tops or
apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground
(conflict area)."
The foregoing makes it perfectly clear that what
Jones received by his patent was the entire lode within
the conflict area and 50 feet upon the surface.
A-8
APPELLANTS' PRETENDED LOCATIONS WERE SURREPTITIOUS AND FRAUDULENT.

The pretended locations and assessment work relied
upon by appellants are surreptitious and fraudulent. It
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is clear from the testimony of Gorlinski and Justheim
that Gorlinski induced Justheim to endeavor to make
lode locations in the middle of respondent's mining operations. (Tr. 235) There is some suggestion in Gorlinski's
testimony that he became acquainted with the area here
involved as long ago as 1902. (Tr. 261, 262) If he did
so he gained his knowledge as the agent and employee of
Excelsior.
It will be remembered that in 1902 the patent covering the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong Iron Mine,
Lot 41, was twenty-three years old. From 1879 until
1902 the patentee of the Armstrong claims and their
successors in interest believed that the Armstrong Mine,
Lot 41, embraced the entire outcropping lode to the south
boundary of the quarter section. If it did not, any omission was due to inadvertence in the survey approved by
the Surveyor General in 1879. In 1902 Jones located the
Cora and first raised the claim which created the conflict
between the Cora and the Armstrong locations. Shortly
thereafter Excelsior brought its first suit in equity to
quiet title against Jones and his Cora location. Gorlinski
may have become familiar with the matter at that time
as an agent and employee of Excelsior. If he did he then
knew that the court adjudged Jones to be the owner of
the entire conflict area by reason of the Cora location.
There is no doubt that Gorlinski knew about the
issuance of the Jones patent in 1912, and about the dispute between Excelsior and Jones as to what was conveyed by the patent. (Tr. 264, 273) It was Gorlinski who
testified in the case before Judge Tillman D. Johnson that
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the Jones patent did not convey the ore body lying in the
conflict area except in so far as the ore body lay beneath
the 50 foot strip known as Tract A. In that case, as in
this case, Gorlinski testified that the conflict area, except
for Tract A, was open to location. (Tr. 273) As long ago
as 1918 Gorlinski knew that the United States court had
rejected his contentions. He knew that his client had been
ordered to and did pay for the entire ore body lying within the conflict area in compliance with, and in reliance
upon, the judgment of the federal court; that the Jones
patent divested the government of any remaining title
to the ore body within the conflict area and vested such
title in Jones. Gorlinski knew that his client, Excelsior,
having so paid for the ore body continued to hold the
same under claim of right. And Gorlinski acquired all
of his information as a confidential employee of Excelsior.
Gorlinski knew as early as 1944 that a road was
being projected into the area to facilitate the mining of
the ore body here involved. He learned that while on a
trip to the property as an employee of Senter F. Walker,
who was then lessee of the area and predecessor of Utah
Construction Company. (Tr. 274).
On April 30,1949, Gorlinski and Justheim must have
known that Utah Construction Company, as lessee of
Excelsior, was, and for a long time had been, actually
and under claim of title engaged in mining the ore body
here involved. They must have known that many men
and elaborate machinery and equipment had been so
persistently engaged in mining the area as to reduce the
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former outcrop to a pit. They must have known that a
good and serviceable access road had been built to the
area to accommodate the movement of heavy equipment
and ore trucks. They knew that an automobile could be
driven easily and quickly to and across the area here involved.
Gorlinski and Jones did not arrive at the area in any
such way. They took a little used road which led to a
point south and down a long slope from the conflict area.
There they waited until the day's work upon the property
had ended. When the trucks had driven away and the
mining machines were quiet, and the miners had been
taken away in the buses, Gorlinski and Justheim climbed
the long hill to the very spot just vacated by respondent's
miners. (Finding 13, Tr. 204, 205, 206, 236) They thought
they had come just when they would have the place all to
themselves—after the occupants had gone and there was
still enough time before dark to "discover" a mine and
stake claims upon it. Only a last pecautionary glance by
the powder foreman before igniting the charges saved
Gorlinski and Justheim from being blasted to eternity.
(Tr. 204 to 206) The last thing the miners did before
leaving the pit was to make the electrical connections
necessary to explode the charges which had been put into
the iron ore. It was the purpose of the powder foreman
to await the departure of all persons from the pit and
then close the switch which would produce the desired
explosion. He was in a position of safety at the blast
house far removed from the pit, and just as he was about
to close the switch he saw a hat approaching the edge of
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the pit. He warned Gorlinski and Justheim away from
the place of danger, and after touching off the blast he
left the premises. No wonder Justheim and Gorlinski
called their pretended claim the "Lucky."
Justheim and Gorlinski hung around until after the
blast and then went into the pit amidst the broken ore
left by the explosion. There they pretended to "discover" four separate claims. (Tr. 127)
The same knowledge which brought Gorlinski to the
property with Justheim on April 20, 1949, had been his
for between forty and fifty years, and yet he waited to
"jump" these claims until he knew that mining upon the
spot had about reached its maximum. The conclusion
is almost irresistible that Gorlinski waited for the time
when he thought his interference would have the greatest
possible nuisance value.
The sham did not stop with the pretended discovery
of a mine and the staking of claims. If Gorlinski and
Justheim were to keep up the pretense they must do the
"annual assessment work" in 1950 and 1951. The law requires that to maintain a location there must be done
annually upon each claim $100.00 worth of work and labor
for the benefit of the claim. (Sec, 28, Title 30 U.S.C.A.)
Did they do or cause any work to be done for the benefit
of the claims? The record shows that respondents had
built an access road across the south end of the area
here involved so that mining could be carried on. The
road was built by piling up rock which was broken down
by mining operations and then surfacing the top of the
rock so piled for the smooth passage of vehicles. Mining
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was then carried on between the roadway and the escarpment to the north. The area between the roadway and the
escarpment was the mining pit of respondents, and it was
within that pit that appellants discovered the mine and
laid their claims. (Tr. 127) The annual assessment done
by appellants in 1950 and 51 "for the benefit of the property" consisted solely in breaking down the north side of
the access road and throwing the material back into the
pit. (Tr. 277, 278, 135) That such work was not for the
benefit of the property but in actual deterioration thereof seems clear.
An examination of the pleadings will disclose thatappellant, Gorlinski, claims an interest in the locations
made by him in the name of Justheim. The complaint
charges that Gorlinski claims an interest in the locations
here involved. Gorlinski did not file a disclaimer but admitted the truth of the allegation that he claimed an interest. He is here appealing from the decree of Judge
Hoyt. We call these matters to the court's attention because the law prohibits a Deputy United States Mineral
Surveyor from having any interest in a mineral location.
The record shows that Gorlinski has been a deputy mineral surveyor for approximately 60 years. (Tr. 260)
He took Justheim with him to the property involved and
led him to respondents' mining pit and suggested that locations be made therein. He was a deputy mineral surveyor during the years of his connection with the property involved, and was a deputy mineral surveyor the
day he did the work in the name of Justheim. A location
in which a deputy mineral surveyor has an interest is
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void. This point was considered and decided in Waskey v.
Hammer, 223 U. S. 85, 56 L. Ed. 359. In the course of its
opinion the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"They are required to take an oath, and to
execute a bond to the United States, as are many
public officer. Within the limits of their authority they act in the stead of the surveyor general and under his direction, and in that sense are
his deputies. The work which they do is the work
of the government, and the surveys which they
make are its surveys. The right performance of
their duties is of real concern, not merely to those
at whose solicitation they act, but also the owners of adjacent and conflicting claims and to the
government. Of the representatives of the government who have to do with the proceedings
incident to applications for patents to mining
claims, they alone come in contact with the land
itself^ and have an opportunity to observe its
situation and character, and the extent and nature
of the work done and improvements made thereon;
and it is upon their reports that the surveyor
general makes the certificate required by Eev0
Stat. Sec, 2325, which is a prerequisite to the
issuance of a patent. * * * The purpose of the
prohibition is to guard against the temptations
and partiality likely to attend efforts to acquire
public lands, or interests therein, by persons so
situated, and thereby to prevent abuse and inspire
confidence in the administration of the public-land
laws. So understanding the letter and purpose
of the prohibition, we think it embraces the location of a mining claim by a mineral surveyor."
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To the same effect is the Utah case of Lavagnino v.
UMig, 26 Utah 1, 71 Pac. 1046, 198 U.S. 444, 49 L. Ed.
1119.
The foregoing should be sufficient to demonstrate
that respondents are entitled to a judgment affirming
Judge Hoyt's order quieting title to the lode or vein in
dispute in respondents. It is our purpose to discuss in
the following pages the points presented by appellants
in their brief numbered from I to VII, inclusive.
B.
APPELLANTS' POINTS
B-l—POINT I.

Material presented under their Point I suggests
that appellants feel under the necessity of establishing
the existence of the "conflict area." There can be no
doubt of the existence of the conflict area. The Armstrong patent conveyed to the patentees all of the surface
of the quarter section involved but omitted the south
135 feet of the Armstrong vein or lode. That error
raised the question as to who owned that portion of the
Jones location lying within the conflict area. Three
separate judgments of the United States court confirmed
title in Jones to all the ore lying within the conflict area
with 50 feet of the surface carved out of the Armstrong
placer.
B-2—POINT II.

Under Point II appellants assert that the quit-claim
deed by Jones and wife conveyed to respondents' pre-
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decessor only such right, title and interest as Jones and
wife possessed at the date of the conveyance. It is without dispute that prior to the date of the deed by Jones
and wife to respondents' predecessor in interest it had
been finally adjudicated by the United States Court
that the Jones patent conveyed the entire lode within
the conflict area to Jones. It is also without dispute that
respondents are presently the owners of all title ever
owned by Jones and wife, or ever conveyed to Jones
by the United States patent (Tr. 26, 28, 29).
In summarizing the litigation involving the conflict
area appellants argue that no decree ever quieted title
to the area in Excelsior and against Jones. They admit,
however, that two equity decrees of the United States
District Court for the District of Utah quieted title to
the area in Jones, and they further admit that respondents presently own all of the rights ever acquired by
Jones.
On page 32 of their brief appellants argue thai
because law action 3044, pending in the United States
District Court before Judge Tillman D. Johnson, was
an action at law based upon a contract nothing germane
to the issue now before this court was decided. A reading of Judge Johnson's judgment and decree (page 14
above), will disclose that appellants' argument upon
the point is without merit. A judgment against Excelsior
and in favor of Colorado Fuel and Iron, as successor in
interest to Jones, could have been supported only by a
finding that the Jones patent conveyed to Jones all of
the iron ore in the conflict area, and that Jones thereby
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became the owner of the ore with the right to sell the
same. Upon cross-examination in this case, Gorlinski
admitted that the claims and contentions made by him
in this case are the same as those made by him before
Judge Johnson (Tr. 273).
In their brief at page 32, appellants say:
"The decree in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Utah, in Equity
Action No. 522, entitled 'Excelsior Iron Mining
Company vs. Thomas J. Jones,' (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 'T') specifically quieted title in Thomas J.
Jones in and to the 'conflict area.' In the action
instituted and prosecuted in the Circuit Court
of the United States District Court for the District
of Utah by Excelsior Iron Mining Company vs.
Thomas J. Jones, being Equity Action No. 1053
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 'U'), although based upon
stipulation of counsel (Plaintiffs' Exhibit ' S ' ) r
nevertheless quieted title in Thomas J. Jones in
the 'conflict a r e a . ' "
The foregoing is an admission of interesting facts
which are beyond dispute. It is noted that in both of
those cases title was quieted in Jones as to the entire
"conflict area," including all of the surface rights as
well as all of the ore lying upon or beneath the surface.
Those decrees gave Jones the full advantage of the error
made in the metes and bounds description of the Armstrong Lode, and proceeded upon the theory that Jones'
location upon the "conflict area" was a valid location,
which had the effect of fully severing from the public
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domain all of the land embraced within the "conflict
area."
B-3—POINT III.

Under Point III appellants contend that the Jones
patent excluded from the lands granted all the conflict
area including the lode or vein lying therein except
Tract A. In view of the three adjudications of this
precise point by the United States District Court, for the
District of Utah, and in view of what has been said upon
the subject hereinbefore, we will not further labor the
point.
In the closing portion of their argument under
Point III of their brief beginning on page 35, appellants
charge that in the case before Judge Johnson respondents' predecessor in interest "took the solemn legal
position in the United States Court that the patent to
Jones excluded the 'conflict area' except Tract A." Our
predecessor did take that position. It took that position
upon the advice of Gorlinski, and it presented it to the
court through Gorlinski as a witness. The United States
Court "solemnly" adjudged and decreed that the position of our predecessor in interest was wrong and the
Gorlinski views and opinions must be rejected. The
judgment and decree so entered became final and binding upon our predecessors in interest and all of its
successors. Counsel for appellants seem to think it
strange that our predecessors, and we as successors in
interest, should feel bound by a final judgment of the
United States Court. By his testimony in this case it is
made clear that Gorlinski disagreed with the judgment
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of the United States Court and has therefore elected
to ignore it.
B-4—POINT IV.

Appellants' Point IV is devoted to an argument that
the field notes, Exhibit B and C, to Stipulation (Tr. 34,
42) which were received in evidence subject to respondents' objection, were properly received in evidence. It
seems so clear upon the facts and the applicable law that
the entire ore body lying within the conflict area now
belongs to respondents that we do not care to obscure the
matter by extended argument upon non-essential points.
At the time of the trial respondents urged, and here urge,
that the field notes were not admissible. If field notes are
referred to in a patent for the purpose of supplying a
description, then they are admissible as a part of the
patent. If they are referred to in the patent only in
connection with recitals setting forth that field notes
were made, then they were inadmissible. Both of the
patents involved in this litigation contain descriptions
complete in themselves and no reference is made to
field notes for the purpose of further detailing descriptions.
In the Jones patent it is simply recited that, "In
pursuance of the provisions of the Kevised Statutes of
the United States, Chapter 6, Title 32, and Legislation
Supplemental thereto, there has been deposited in the
General Land Office of the United States the Plat and
Field Notes of Survey and the Certificate of the Eegister of the Land Office at Salt Lake City, Utah, accom-
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panied by other evidence whereby it appears that
Thomas J. Jones did, on September 21, 1910, duly enter
and pay for that certain mining claim," etc. The foregoing is simply a recital of antecedent facts and does
not leave any of the description set forth in the patent
to be supplemented by the Field Notes.
The Armstrong patent makes no reference to the
Field Notes.
In Lindley on Mines, Vol. 3, Third Edition, Sec. 778,
page 1894, it is said:
"It may be announced as a general rule that
a patent is conclusive evidence as to the limits
of a location, and that it cannot be assailed by
showing that its actual boundaries were different
from those described in the patent.
"Nor are the proceedings on which its issuance was based admissible in evidence to impeach
or vary it."
B-5—POINT V.

Point V of appellants' brief covers 51 pages. It is
devoted to a labored effort to give some special and
unique character to the ore body involved which will
deprive respondents of the benefits of their ancient
discoveries, and allow appellants to enjoy the fruits of
such discoveries.
In Point V appellants ignore the controlling fact
that we are here concerned with a lode claim within
a prior placer.
Findings 10, 11 and 19 made by the court below
describe generally the ore body here involved. No. 10
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describes it by surface dimensions and finds that its
surface embraces the surface area of Tract "A" and the
four Lucky claims.
Finding 11 finds that the ore body is "a body of
iron bearing rock in place embedded in a trough-like
depression with its walls converging as they descend.
Finding 19 is: u The lode or vein lying within the
Armstrong Iron Mine, Lot No. 41, and within the conflict
area, including the four Lucky claims and 'Tract A /
is a single indivisible lode or body of ore, and the discovery within Tract A lies upon the apex of said lode
or vein."
The foregoing findings are fully supported by the
evidence and compel the conclusion that appellants are
without any right or interest in or to any part of the
conflict area.
There is nothing obscure about the ore body here
involved. The truth about it has been laid bare by inspection, prospective drilling and actual mining. What
is apparent today tells the trained geologist what was
likely there ages ago. Iron bearing fluids penetrated
the calcareous sandstone and molecule by molecule the
calcareous sandstone was replaced by iron. The result
was a vast lense of homogeneous iron ore lying between
the pinto sandstone on one side and the pinto sandstone
or monzonite on the other. To what elevation the formation thus created reached in prehistoric times no one
can say. Certainly it is not a blanket or horizontal bed
now, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that
it ever was such.
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Erosion began to work and as the ages passed the
formation was worn off^$ecause the sandstone and monzonite was softer than the iron ore (magnatite) the
walls eroded faster than the iron ore leaving the iron
to protrude or outcrop above the country rock. What
remained by the time first involved here was what both
geologists, Christensen and Hansen, described as the
roots of the original deposit—a truncated V with iron
ore still occupying the remainder of the V (Tr. 162,
163).
The ore body varies in some respects from the veins
or lodes often encountered in this area, but that it constitutes a vein or lode cannot be doubted. The issuance
by the United States of patents in recognition and confirmation of lode locations made upon the ore body
forecloses any argument now that the ore body is not
a vein or lode, or that it is without an apex.
The ore body bears no relationship to the horizontal
or blanket lodes referred to in the books and typified
by the Leadville formations. Horizontal or blanket lodes
have identifying characteristics. They lie upon and
below contacting sedimentaries which are in turn horizontal and which are parallel to each other and to the
intervening vein or bed. The ore body here involved
has none of the characteristics of the blanket vein. It
is not a plane in the geometric sense (Tr. 172). It has
no contact with any horizontal sedimentary above, and
there is no evidence to support any inference that there
ever was any such contact. Its long axis may be and
was referred to by the expert witnesses as its strike,
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but it does not have a true dip because of its close and
narrow confinement by the converging walls of the country rock (Tr. 172).
The Armstrong and Jones locations, and the issuance of patents based thereon, have given rise to certain conclusive presumptions which fully meet the contentions of appellants. It is necessary to review certain
aspects of those locations.
Locations upon the Armstrong Placer and upon the
Armstrong Lode were made by Blair, Smith and Adams
on the 4th day of October, 1871. It was Blair, Smith
and Adams in 1871, and not Gorlinski and Justheim
in 1949, who discovered the iron mine. Patent was issued
upon the Armstrong Placer and the Armstrong Lode
on the 16th day of December, 1879. The issuance of the
patent upon the Armstrong Lode raised the conclusive
presumption that all things necessary to a valid location, including the discovery of ore upon the apex of the
vein and all other things prerequisite to the issuance
of a patent, had been lawfully done. Except for an inadvertent error in the survey of 1879 patent would have
vested title in Walker and Blair as successors of the
Armstrong locations to all the ore in the conflict area.
Jones made his location of the Cora No. 1 in 1902.
The boundaries marked off upon the land and described
by Jones in his location of the Cora included the conflict
area. The effect of Jones' location was to detach from
the public domain all the area embraced within his
boundaries except such as had already been covered
by prior valid location or patents. Again it was Jones
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in 1902, and not Gorlinski or Justheim in 1949, who discovered iron in the Cora. A valid mineral location gives
to the locator the equivalent of fee simple title to the
land described against all the world but the government,
and it gives to the locator a right to patent which the
government itself cannot deny or avoid if the locator
maintains his location in good standing and does all the
things required by the law as prerequisite to patent.
The mining laws in 1902 gave any locator who made
a "discovery" the right to locate and acquire a claim
up to 1500 feet in length along the vein and up to 600
feet in width, subject to the provision that if the lode
location be upon a lode or vein known to exist within
a prior placer location, the width of the location upon
the surface shall be limited to 50 feet.
Jones located upon approximately 135 feet in length
and 600 feet in width upon the Armstrong Lode or vein
(Ex. AA, pp. 13, 14). By that location he acquired
all of the surface and all of the minerals within the
conflict area not theretofore lost to the government upon
issuance of the Armstrong patent.
Acting upon Jones' application for patent the land
office determined that the surface of the conflict area
was covered by the Armstrong Placer patent and that
Jones was therefore entitled to only 50 feet upon the
surface of the placer claim. It therefore excluded from
the patent all of the surface except 50 feet which was
deemed sufficient to permit the mining of the entire lode
embraced within the conflict area.
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This court has been required to consider the mining
laws of the land in numerous cases, and at least two
of its decisions are of special significance here.
Bullion Beck and Champion Mining Co. v. Eureka
Hill Mining Company} 5 Utah 3,11 Pac. 515, was decided
by this court in July of 1886. It thereafter became one
of the celebrated mining cases of the west.
The following excerpts are pertinent:
"The act.of 1872 is entitled 'An Act to promote the development of the mineral resources of
the United States.' Its first section declares all
valuable mineral deposits of the public domain
to be free and open to exploration, etc. The second
section forbids a location without a discovery of
a vein or lode. # # * These mining laws unmistakably discover an intention to favor and reward
diligent discoverers and developers of mines.
Letters patent protect the man who invents a new
machine for the application of the forces of nature
to the uses of man, for the reason that his intelligence, his labor, and his enterprise have conferred a benefit upon society. The public good,
as well as justice, demands that the inventor
should be encouraged. So the prospector who
climbs the mountains, and digs and toils, and discovers a valuable mine, ought to be protected,
encouraged, and rewarded for his enterprise, his
toil, and his skill. This, it is believed, the public
good, as well as justice, demands, and justice and
the public good are the chief ends of this law.
* * * While this section limits the right of a
person to a lode longitudinally, it does not limit
such right in the direction of the width of the
lode. The right as to the width of the surface
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ground is limited, but not the right as to the width
of the vein. * * * By complying with the law the
first discoverer takes it all as the reward for his
diligence and enterprise; and this would be so
notwithstanding that the united lode might be
under the surface ground of the junior claim. * # #
"The law contemplated its (the vein) segregation in its length, not in its width. I t refers to
lodes between the end lines, not to a p a r t of a lode.
No expression can be found in it indicating an
intention to limit the rights of the locator to a
portion of the lode in its width. The discovery of
any part of the apex of a vein is regarded by it
as a discovery of the entire apex. And we think
that the law of 1872, when all of its provisions
are considered together, and in connection with
the former law on the subject, as it should be,
evinces the same extent. Under this law the discoverer of any part of the apex gets the right to
its entire width, despite the fact that a portion
of the width may be outside of the surface side
lines of his claim extended downwards
vertically.
While he has no right to the extra lateral surface,
he has a right to the extra lateral lode beneath
the surface." (Italics ours).
While Bullion Beck v. Champion does not deal with
a lode claim within a prior placer, it is controlling authority for the proposition that Jones, having located
upon the ore body within the "conflict area" is entitled
to the whole ore body unlimited in width and limited in
length to approximately 135 feet. It also shows the disposition of the court to reward those who "discover"
mines and spend their talents and their funds in developing them as against those who later attempt to take
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advantage of the early discovery and diligent operation.
It is difficult to conceive of a claim having less equity
than that here asserted by Gorlinski and Justheim.
Another celebrated decision of this court is Grand
Central Mining Co. v. Mammoth Mining Company, 83
Pac. 648, 29 Utah 490. It contains the following significant and controlling statement:
"We concede, as claimed by appellant, that
a patent to a mining claim raises a conclusive
presumption that there is the apex of a vein within the patented ground (1 Lindley on Mines, Sec.
305)."
This rule announced by this court is in harmony
with the law of the land and is a conclusive answer to the
argument of counsel that the ore body involved was and
is without apex.
In Section 305 of Vol. 1 of Lmdley on Mines, Third
Ed., p. 676, referred to by this court in the case next above
cited, there is this statement:
"(1) No lode location is valid unless it includes, to some extent at least, within vertical
planes drawn through the surface boundaries, the
top, or apex, of a discovered vein at least as
against a subsequent locator properly inclosing
such apex within his surface boundaries."
In Vol. 3, Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, Sec. 780,
p. 1899, this appears:
"The issuance of a lode patent conclusively
presumes the existence within its boundaries of
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an apex, as this is a fact necessary to support its
validity. But it will not be presumed that this
apex takes any particular direction or extends for
any definite length."
The issuance to Jones of his patent raised the conclusive presumption that there was an apex upon the ore
body, and that it lay within Tract "A." An interesting
statement of the point is found in Snyder on Mines,
Section 796, which reads as follows:
"The Courts have applied many definitions,
some differing from others, but generally they
reach the conclusion that the apex means the
beginning or edge of the vein or lode; that portion
which approaches nearest the surface of the earth.
It is sometimes synonymous with the word 'outcrop' and where the edge or beginning of the vein
comes to the surface on the strike thereof, it is
correctly so used."
Farther on in the section Snyder points out that
what is meant by the apex is that part of the strike of
the vein which forms its outer edge, the edge nearest
the surface of the earth, "whether it be in fact its highest point or not."
In Section 799 of Snyder, this language appears:
"In all such cases the apex means the entire
top of the vein or ore matter between the boundaries, bounding planes or walls as the case may
be. For it is said to be sufficient to give the right
to pursue such vein or ore body on its downward
course, that its surface exposure or apex as here-
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in defined never wholly departs from the vertical
bounding planes of the location."
One of the most interesting mining cases in all the
books arose in Salt Lake County and was finally decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Lawson v.
U.S. Mining Co., 207 U.S. 5, 52 L. Ed. 65. In the course
of his opinion for the court Mr. Justice Brewer said:
"Treating this limestone as a single broad
vein, it is apparent that the entire apex is not
within the surface of either the Kempton or Ashland, but that it is also found in the Old Jordan
and Mountain Gem, — the properties of the plaintiff. The lime which divides the surface of the
claims of the defendants from the Old Jordan
and Mountain Gem claims also bisects the vein
as it comes to the surface. In other words, part
of the apex is within plaintiff's claims and part
within defendants'. In such a case the senior location takes the entire width of the vein on its dip.
This was the conclusion of the court of appeals,
as shown by this quotation from its opinion (p.
592):
"Where two or more mining claims longitudinally bisect or divide the apex of a vein, the
senior claim takes the entire width of the vein
on its dip, if it is in other respects so located as
to give a right to pursue the vein downward outside of the side lines. This is so because it has
been the custom among miners, since before the
enactment of the mining laws, to regard and treat
the vein as a unit and indivisible, in point of width,
as respects the right to pursue it extralaterally
beneath the surface; because usually the width
of the vein is so irregular, and its strike and dip
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depart so far from right lines, that it is altogether
impracticable, if not impossible, to continue the
longitudinal bisection at the apex throughout the
vein on its dip or downward course; and because
it conforms to the principle pervading the mining
laws, that priority of discovery and of location
gives the better right, as illustrated in the provision giving to the senior claim all ore contained
in the space of intersection where two or more
veins intersect or cross each other, and in the
further provision giving to the senior claim the
entire vein at and below the point of union, where
two or more veins with distinct apices and embraced in separate claims unite in their course
downward. Eev. Stat. Sec. 2336, U.S. Comp. Stat.
1901, p. 1436.'
"We fully indorse the views thus expressed.
Discovery is the all-important fact upon which
title to mines depends. Lindley, in his work on
Mines, 2d ed. vol. 1, Sec. 335, says :
" 'Discovery in all ages and all countries has
been regarded as conferring rights or claims to
reward. Gamboa, who represented the general
thought of his age on this subject, was of the
opinion that the discoverer of mines was even
more worthy of reward than the inventor of a
useful art. Hence, in the mining laws of all civilized countries, the great consideration for granting mines to individuals is discovery. "Rewards
so bestowed," says Gamboa, "besides being a
proper return for the labor and anxiety of the
discoverers, have the further effect of stimulating
others to search for veins and mines, on which
the general prosperity of the state depends."'
"The two thoughts here presented are reward
for the time and labor spent in making the discovery, thus adding to the general wealth, and
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incentive to others to prosecute searches for veins
and mines. To take from the discoverer a portion
of that which he has discovered and give it to
one who may have been lead to make an adjoining
location by a knowledge of the discovery, and
without any previous searching for mineral, is
manifest injustice." * * *
"In Bullion, B. & C. Min. Co. v. Eureka Hill
Min. Co., 5 Utah 3, 11 Pae. 515, the question is
discussed at some length by Chief Justice Zane.
In the course of the opinion it is said (p. 54):
" 'Under the law of 1866 the surface ground
was merely for the convenient working of the lode.
The discoverer and first locator took the lode in
its entirety. The law contemplated its segregation
in its length, not in its width. It refers to lodes
between the end lines not to a part of a lode.
No expression can be found in it indicating an
intention to limit the rights of the locator to a
portion of the lode in its width. The discovery
of any part of the apex of a vein is regarded by
it as a discovery of the entire apex. And we think
that the law of 1872, when all of its provisions
are considered together, and in connection with
the former law on the subject, as it should be,
evinces the same intent. Under this law the discoverer of any part of the apex gets the right
* to its entire width, despite the fact that a portion
of the width may be outside of the surface side
lines of his claim extended downwards vertically.
While he has no right to the extralateral surface,
he has a right to the extralateral lode beneath
the surface.'"
We have read all of the decisions cited by appellants
in support of the argument made under Point V. In
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developing and pursuing their arguments appellants overlook and ignore the controlling fact that we are here
concerned with the location of a lode within a prior
placer. Typical of the cases relied upon by appellants
is State v. District Court, 25 Mont. 504, 65 Pac. 1020.
Eeliance is had upon that case by appellants because
within the course of its opinion the Montana court says:
"A discovery of a vein upon unoccupied land
is absolutely essential to the validity of a location."
The quoted statement has no application to the location upon a known lode or vein within a prior placer.
If it did then neither Jones nor appellants nor anyone
else could ever have made any valid location within the
conflict area because the entire conflict area was "occupied" by the Armstrong placer.
While Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Mike and Starr Gold
and Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S. 394, 36 L. Ed. 20, refers
to a lode within a placer, it decides only that a jury in
the trial court was justified upon conflicting evidence
in finding that a lode was known to exist within the
placer claim at the time of application for the placer.
B-6—POINT VI.

Appellants' Point VI is stated in this language :
"THE PATENT ISSUED TO WALKER AND BLAIR
COVERING THE ARMSTRONG PLACER CLAIM AND THE
ARMSTRONG 'IRON MINE' INCLUDED NO PART OF THE
MINERAL DEPOSIT, EXCLUDING PLACER RIGHTS, SITUATE IN THE 'CONFLICT AREA/ "
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The foregoing correctly states that the patent issued
to Walker and Blair included and conveyed the surface
of the conflict area as placer ground. Otherwise the
statement is incorrect. We have presented respondents'
position and argued the case upon the theory that an
error in the application for the Armstrong patent left
the south 135 feet of the iron lode subject to appropriation and location notwithstanding there was no
unoccupied surface within the conflict area. The federal
court has three times held that because of the error in
description in the application for the Armstrong patent
the lode within the conflict area was open to location,
and it three times held that such lode was appropriated
by the Jones location.
B-7—POINT VII.

Point VII is an effort by appellants to explain and
excuse the stealthy and surreptitious entry upon the conflict area by Grorlinski and Justheim for the purpose of
discovering and locating claims thereon. We have heretofore discussed in some detail Grorlinski's long connection with the area involved and the clandestine manner in which he and Justheim endeavored to "jump" the
claims involved.
This court has had occasion to consider conduct similar in quality to that of Justheim and Gorlinski. The
question was presented to this court in Springer v.
Southern Pacific Co., 67 Utah 590, 248 Pac. 819. The
mineral involved in the Springer case was limerock lying
in clifts and ledges on the west side of Great Salt Lake.
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Under the law it was subject to location only as placer
ground, but about 1904 it was erroneously located by
Southern Pacific's predecessor in interest by lode locations. Thereafter for many years Southern Pacific occupied, possessed and extensively worked the deposits
embraced within the lode locations. Springer knew of
the possession and occupancy of Southern Pacific and of
the extensive mining operations carried on. He also
knew that the property had been erroneously covered
by lode locations. Those representing him went upon
the land in the very early hours of the morning before
the miners and their equipment arrived and pretended
to stake out placer claims which covered the very pit
in which Southern Pacific was mining. It was ruled by
this court that no rights were acquired by the pretended
locations. This court relied chiefly upon the statute of
limitations to support its decision, but it had the following pertinent comments to make:
"In this connection it should also be remembered that the court found (and we think the
evidence supports the finding) that the appellants
'early in the morning of said day (the day the
location was made), long before working hours
and either before or about daylight, clandestinely
and surreptitiously entered upon and invaded the
actual possession of said claims # * * and attempted to locate a portion thereof by embracing the same within an association placer mining
location, called the "Barney Google" placer mining claim. * * *9 Had the appellants entered upon
said claims with force and arms, no one would,
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we think, contend that they could acquire any
rights in or to the mineral lands as against another
in actual possession thereof and working the
ground under an attempted location. What one
may not do by force he likewise may not accomplish surreptitiously or by stealth. That such is
the law applicable to the location of mining claims
is too well settled to require the citation of authorities."
One needs only to read the foregoing to be impressed
by the close parallel between the methods employed by
Springer and those by Gorlinski and Justheim.
CONCLUSION
The written stipulation made and filed by the parties
(Tr. 22 et. seq.) contains the agreement that respondent.
Excelsior Iron Mining Company, is the owner of all the
rights conveyed by the Armstrong and Jones patents.
The combined effect of the locations upon which those
patents were based was to segregate the entire conflict
area, including all of the iron lode therein, from the public domain. The effect of the patents was to vest the
entire conflict area in respondents' predecessors in interest. The District Court of the United States has so
adjudged. It would be a strange and disquieting result
if after more than 30 years of reliance upon the final
judgment of the United States Court the rights of respondents shall now be destroyed by a judgment of the
state court.
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In Waskey v. Hammer, supra, the Supreme Court of
the United States made the point that after a ruling of
the Land Office had been relied upon for 25 years it
would be unwise to change the rule.
No part of the Armstrong lode within the conflict
area, and no part of the surface of the area, was public
domain and open to location when appellants made their
pretended locations of the Lucky claims. Appellants are
without right and title to the area for the further reasons:
(1) That their entry upon the land was stealthy and
fraudulent; and,
(2) Kobert Grorlinski was at the time Deputy United
States Mineral Surveyor claiming an interest in the
locations.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KAY, RAWLINS, JONES &
HENDERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee,
Excelsior Iron Mining Co.
KAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellee,
Utah Construction Company
FRANKLIN RITER
Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

